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Abstract 
The Moral Foundations Theory strives to explain human morality and political differences on the 
individual and the group level. According to the theory there are five core moral foundations that 
humans intuitively rely on in the process of moralising. There has been research into how the moral 
foundations profile with regards to political identities. Here liberals and conservatives tend to rely on 
different foundational values when moralising. However, there is no previous research on how the 
Moral Foundations Theory and political identity works in military samples. Researching this facet of 
values in the military has an inherent value for military education but also in exploring how the MFT 
replicates in military populations. 
 
This study uses data from a survey (N = 167) among military cadettes at the Finnish National Defence 
University to compare the results from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire with political identification 
measured on a two-dimensional self-placement instrument. A two-step cluster analysis on the MFT 
material identified four distinct clusters of moral profiles within the sample. Variance analysis on the 
clusters using the political self-placement measure confirmed that the liberal and the libertarian 
clusters hold significantly more liberal values than the two conservative clusters, the loyal-
conservative and the authoritarian-conservative, on the social political measure. The sample data 
suggests that loyalty and authority are the most important values for this population while harm, 
sanctity and fairness score lower and display a greater degree of variation between the clusters. 
 
It appears that the MFT does not replicate fully in the FNDU sample. The clusters are loosely 
identifiable as previous research would suggest, but they display significant anomalies in the form of 
exceptionally high loyalty and authority, which is unique in any WEIRD population. The skewed 
gender representation (93.4 % men) of the sample, the translated MFQ and the NDU context are 
probable contributing factors to this phenomenon. However, the political self-placement measure 
replicated as expected on social values with regards to the MFT profiles even if the differences were 
small.  
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Abstract 
Moralfundamentsteorin (Moral Foundations Theory, MFT) strävar efter att förklara mänsklig moral 
och politiska skillnader på individ- och gruppnivå. Enligt teorin finns det fem grundläggande moraliska 
fundament som människor intuitivt förlitar sig på i moraliseringsprocessen. I forskningen har det 
undersökts hur de moraliska fundamenten profilerar med avseende på politiska identiteter. Här 
tenderar liberaler och konservativa att förlita sig på olika fundament när de moraliserar. Det finns dock 
ingen tidigare forskning om hur MFT och politisk identitet fungerar i militära sampel. Att undersöka 
denna aspekt av värderingar i militären har ett värde för militär utbildning men också i att utforska hur 
MFT replikerar i militära sampel. 
 
Denna studie använder data från en undersökning (N = 167) bland militära kadetter vid Finlands 
Försvarshögskola för att jämföra resultaten från Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) med politisk 
identitet uppmätt på ett tvådimensionellt självplaceringsinstrument. En tvåstegs klusteranalys på 
MFT-materialet identifierade fyra distinkta kluster av moraliska profiler i samplet. Variansanalys på 
klustren på basis av det politiska självplaceringsinstrumentet bekräftade att det liberala och det 
nyliberala klustret har betydligt mer liberala värden än de två konservativa klustren, det lojal-
konservativa och det autoritär-konservativa, på den socialpolitiska värdemätaren. Resultaten pekar 
på att lojalitet och auktoritet är de viktigaste fundamenten i detta sampel medan omtanke, helighet 
och rättvisa får lägre poäng och visar en större grad av variation mellan klustren. 
 
Det verkar som om MFT inte replikerar väl i det här militära samplet. Klustren liknar delvis de kluster 
som tidigare forskning identifierat, men de uppvisar avvikelser i form av exceptionellt hög lojalitet och 
auktoritet. Den ojämna könsrepresentationen (93,4 % män) i samplet, den översatta MFQ-enkäten 
och det militära sammanhanget är troliga bidragande faktorer till detta fenomen. De politiska 
självidentifikationsresultaten på sociala värderingar replikerades som förväntat i förhållande till MFT-
profilerna även om skillnaderna mellan klustren var små. 
Nyckelord 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) is a relatively new theory of human morality. 
It is based on the underlying idea that humans share no universal morality, but rather 
an inherent readiness to feel moral intuitions. These intuitions then form the basis of 
our moral judgements. The MFT works on the moral intuitionist model, in which a 
stimulus provokes an emotion, or intuition, which is then rationalised or scrutinised 
by the conscious mind (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, 2012). The MFT has been used to 
explore and explain the moral decision making of individuals and groups (Graham et 
al., 2011) but has simultaneously become a widespread tool for analysing the 
underlying mechanisms of political identification and orientation as well (Smith et al., 
2016).  
Despite of its popularity, there is no research to be found on how the MFT works in 
military populations when comparing the MFT with political orientation. In fact, the 
only study that analyses the MFT in a military context is D. J. Perez (2019) newly 
published doctoral dissertation, where the effect of wartime experiences on morality 
is explored. Understanding the warrior mind and moral decisioning naturally has an 
intrinsic value when developing military education, practices on operational 
deployment abroad, and for national crisis readiness in general, but also on a wider 
societal level in terms of deepening the understanding of human morality and its plural 
facets.  
The goals of this study are twofold. First, I aim to identify and analyse typical MFT 
profiles in a military population. This will be accomplished by using the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) material from a survey at the Finnish National 
Defence University (FNDU) for cluster analysis. The second goal is to explore how 
these clusters identify and perhaps differ on the political spectrum. Thus, this study 
pioneers the exploration of MFT into the military context by following the footsteps 
of Haidt et al. (2009) study on MFT clustering and political orientation.  
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To summarize, this study examines the functionality of the MFT’s application for 
political orientation analysis and moral profiling in a Finnish military population. This 
study is the first to explore how this MFT application works in a military sample.  
 
2. MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the origins of the MFT. This will 
give the reader the tools needed to understand the theoretical reference frame of the 
MFT and its applications and shortcomings. First, the theoretical background for the 
MFT is described. This includes the evolutionary and social underpinnings of human 
morality, the moral intuitionist model, and finally the actual MFT. When the 
theoretical reference frame has been established the MFT’s critics are discussed.  
 
2.1. What is Morality? 
Some sense of morality has been at the centre of human culture as long as social 
interaction has existed. In a way, our cultures might be considered virtue based. 
Certain sets of characteristics and behaviours that are seen as ideal and good, and 
morally superior. However, these virtues are often context- and role specific. They 
also vary over time and among cultures (MacIntyre, 1981; Vitz, 1990). 
The theory of sociocultural evolution is one of the most prominent contemporary 
explanations for human morality (Tivel, 2012). However, some argue that morality 
might be a predominantly biological quality and the product of evolutionary forces 
and group selection. In this sociobiological view, morality is evolved the way it is 
simply because the set of behaviours that constitute morality contribute to survival and 
reproduction. Empathy, guilt and other emotions are thus seen as the evolutionary 
response to enhance pro-social behaviour in humans (Schermer, 2004). Reciprocal 
behaviour, empathy and even acts of altruism and a sense of fairness are all well 
documented among mammals. And this fact strengthens the evolutionary hypothesis 
since pro-social behaviour is clearly not a uniquely human attribute but shared across 
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species among mammals that live in social groups (Bekoff & Pierce, 2009; deWaal, 
1997). 
However, the age-old argument of nature vs nurture is prominent within the field of 
moral psychology despite of the sociobiological paradigm. With the cultural 
constructionist perspective on one side and the cognitive developmental view on the 
other. This argument may also be divided into the moral empiricist perspective and 
the nativist perspective. The empiricist/constructionists argue that all moral 
knowledge and believes are learned in childhood and refined through adolescence. 
Hence morality is not inherent or built into the human mind, but rather facilitated by 
the cognitive mechanisms that enable morality to be learned and taught. On the other 
side, the nativist/developmentalists argue that moral behaviour and the moral process 
is inherent through evolution. In this view all humans raised in similar environments 
would come to the same moral conclusions even in the absence of adults (Haidt & 
Craig, 2004; Haidt, 1992, Haidt 2012). 
From the developmental perspective, Kohlberg (1971) claimed to have demonstrated 
that morality is universal and revolves around issues of justice. He hypothesised that, 
given the right conditions, moral development would go through the same stages in 
all humans. Furthermore, he considered cultural differences to stain mainly from 
socioeconomical and educational factors as well as differences in democratic and non-
democratic societal structures. Continuing Kohlberg´s influential work, Turiel (1983) 
found that Kohlberg’s classifications of moral development in humans was biased in 
the favour of individuals who have the ability to explain abstract concepts such as 
utilitarianism and the societal need for social regulation. Turiel proved that, even as 
Kohlberg’s classifications favoured verbally more adapt individuals, the results were 
quite different when the test questions were reduced into simple yes or no questions. 
In this way, Turiel found that even young children can and do make a difference 
between contextual social norms and more universal moral rules. 
Based on this evidence it was concluded that humans consider some acts intrinsically 
bad and harmful while others are not, even though they might be undesirable in certain 
contexts. In other words, there seemed to be a realm of universal morality based on 
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the concepts of fairness, justice, and reciprocity that even children could identify. This 
cognitive developmental perspective thus suggests that the principles of rationality, 
the senses of justice and fairness are what form the basis of the human moral code 
(Nucci & Turiel, 2008; Nucci, 1981). 
If human morality was inherent and universal, then we should be able to observe great 
similarities across cultures, which we do. However, we also observe great 
discrepancies even within culturally homogenous societies and even greater ones 
between cultures. For example, some cultures differentiate between acts that are 
considered universally immoral and acts that may seem undesirable but still lie outside 
of the social regulative domain and thus could and should be judged according to 
personal preference. But in contrast, many cultures extend the domain of social 
regulation further as if it was a part of a universal morality. This discrepancy is clearly 
observed between societies that lie within the WEIRD (Western, Educated, 
Industrialised, Rich and Democratic) sphere and those that lie outside it (Haidt, 1992; 
Haidt, 2012). This forms a basis of compelling evidence for a culturally constructed 
morality that often extends beyond the enlightenment concepts of justice and 
rationality. For example, even though the cognitive developmental theory predicts that 
disgusting or disrespectful but nonetheless harmless acts should be judged as matters 
of personal preference and context bound social norms they are sometimes judged and 
reacted to as if they were universal moral violations. Why? The cognitive 
developmental perspective did not account for human affect and emotion, but 
consistently relied upon the basis of rationality, universality and the first principle 
basis to explore morality (Shweder, Mahapatra & Miller, 1987; Miller, Bersoff & 
Hardwood, 1990, Haidt, 1992). 
So even though acts with harmful or unjust consequences seem to be important in 
moral judgement across cultures, some victimless acts still produce a similar affective 
response as if within the moral domain. Disgust and disrespect as well as disobedience 
and deference to authority are examples of acts that facilitate an affective moral 
response and are often rationalised by individuals as harmful even if they are 
victimless, private or have no concrete harmful consequences (Haidt, 1992). And 
many cultures have rules regarding food and sexual taboos. Several anthropological 
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studies have concluded that breaking these rules give rise to moral emotions and 
reactions such as disgust (Douglas, 1966; Meigs, 1984). Why are these acts considered 
intrinsically immoral regardless of their consequences?  
Haidt (1992) concluded that the western research tradition had limited itself to 
exploring morality as issues of harm, justice and rationality, even though many 
cultures clearly encompass a broader moral sense of the moral domain and yet share 
so many similarities. This called for an expanded model for human morality that aims 
to integrate the cognitive developmental perspective with the cultural constructionist. 
According to Haidt and Craig (2004) the missing link lies in the exploring of human 
morality in the realm of intuitions, affect and emotions. 
 
2.2. The Moral Foundations Theory 
Enter the MFT. The MFT originates from social psychologists J. Haidt, J. Graham and 
C. Joseph research. The theory aims to bridge the gap between the moral empiricist 
and moral nativist perspectives by exploring how our inherent qualities combine with 
learned reasoning and together form our processes of moral reasoning. The MFT has 
quickly become a prominent theory of human morality and a widely adopted tool for 
examining and explaining how morality and political orientation intertwine (Haidt & 
Joseph, 2008; Smith et al., 2016).  
The theory is based on the moral intuitionist model. This model offers an alternate 
view that bridges the nativist and empiricist standpoints. Haidt and Joseph (2004) 
propose that humans have an inherent set of qualities described as “an innate 
preparedness to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of 
events involving other human beings”. These intuitive flashes then form the basis of 
our process of moralising and underlie the ethics developed by all cultures. Thus, the 
human mind does not come as a blank slate, but we are born with tools that later 
develop into our sense of morality through our experiences. As such, the cultural 
learning process is preceded by the instinctual drives that allow environmental factors 
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and learning to provide culture-specific values and norms to develop (Haidt & Joseph, 
2004; Graham et al., 2013). 
According to the moral intuitionist model (Fig. 1) the human mind can be divided into 
two separate processing systems (comparable with “Thinking, Fast and Slow” by D. 
Kahneman 2011). The first system is an intuitive, subconscious, quick, and automatic 
system of thought that operates almost without effort. It relies on our psychological 
constructs and the individuals intuitive understanding of the world. Conscious 
reasoning, the secondary system of thought, is used to provide rational justification or 
scrutinization for what the first system presents. According to this model a stimulus 
first elicits a “gut feeling”, a moral intuition about how to react and how to feel. This 
intuition then leads to an intuitive judgement of the situation that elicited the intuition 
by the first system of thought. This intuitive judgement is then passed on to the 
secondary system, which often confirms the intuition by post hoc reasoning: “This 
feels wrong, so it must be wrong”. As such, human morality is reactionary and not 
rational, but often rationalising (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt, 2012). 
 
The MFT recognises there to be at least five inherent sources for moral intuitions, 
called moral foundations within the theory. These foundations are based on the 
Figure 1. Moral intuitionist model from Haidt & Joseph, 2004. 
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expressed moral concerns that individuals present when confronted with a moral 
dilemma. The five foundations are Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, 
Authority/Subversion, and Sanctity/Degradation. These five moral foundations are 
subsequently categorised into two clusters. The individualising cluster, containing 
Harm and Fairness, and the group binding cluster, including Loyalty, Authority and 
Sanctity (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2008; 
Graham, Nosek & Haidt, 2011; Graham et al. 2013). 
 
2.2.1. The individualising cluster 
The foundations in the individualising cluster are referred to as individualising 
foundations since they concern the rights of individuals and aim to limit the 
consequences of self-interest. These foundations are often used in enlightenment 
ethics, the rational, utilitarian grounds touched upon previously (Graham et al., 2011, 
Haidt, 2012).  
Care/Harm 
This moral dimension is strongly related to our evolutionary process as mammals and 
to our attachment systems, and our ability to empathize. This dimension supports 
virtues such as kindness, empathy, and gentleness. Liberal and politically left leaning 
people hold this dimension in high regard in their moral reasoning and intuition – how 
can it be wrong if no one was harmed? (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2012). 
Fairness/Cheating 
The moral intuitions and rationalizations regarding fairness are related to the 
evolutionary processes preceding reciprocal altruism, and supports ideas of justice, 
universal rights, and autonomy. Originally, this moral dimension included the concept 
of equality as well, but was revisited in 2011, based on new data, which endorsed the 
emphasis on proportionality instead of total equality (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 
2012). 
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2.2.2. The group binding cluster 
The group binding foundations serve to facilitate group formation and cohesion within 
groups. Here authority and loyalty are especially important in facilitating solidarity 
and respect. Sanctity is theorized to have evolved to curb human desires and often 
manifests itself as traditional values or religious beliefs (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2008). 
Loyalty/Betrayal 
The loyalty dimension was shaped through our history of human tribalism. Virtues 
that relate to this dimension are patriotism and self-sacrifice for the group. The loyalty 
dimension is present at any time when people put the best of their group in front of 
their own self-interest (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2012). 
Authority/Subversion 
This dimension relates to our species long history of hierarchical social interactions, 
and lies behind virtues such as leadership, devoir to legitimate authority, and respect 
for traditions. More conservative people tend to feel that this moral foundation is an 
important one in their moral reasoning and the precursory moral intuition (Graham et 
al., 2011; Haidt, 2012). 
Sanctity/Degradation 
The dimension of sanctity is founded on empiricism behind the psychology of disgust 
that underlies many religious concepts of a pure, more noble, way of living. For 
example, treating your body like a temple that must not be contaminated by immoral 
activities, such as substances or taboos regarding sex and sexuality (Graham et al., 
2011; Haidt, 2012). 
Sinn and Hayes (2016) have concluded that the moral foundations are indeed social-
evolutionary answers to the problems that were common in the environment of 
humanity’s’ cradle – the hunter gatherer society. And more specifically, to the 
conflicts within tribes and between tribes. They postulate that the three dimensions of 
the binding cluster, loyalty, authority and sanctity, favour solutions for intertribal 
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conflicts, while the dimensions of the individualizing cluster, care and fairness, 
balance out the binding virtues with greater regard for the individuals within the group.  
Conclusively, the MFT consists of five moral foundations, each corresponding with 
an evolutionary or adaptive challenge that humans have had to face. The theory aims 
to merge evolution, psychology, and social development. Within the MFT, morality 
or at least our process of moralising, is considered innate, described as a preparedness 
to feel moral emotion, and rationalise or scrutinise it (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). 
 
2.3. The moral foundations questionnaire 
The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) is the instrument for measuring the 
foundations within the MFT. The MFQ is a self-report measure assessing which of the 
moral foundation an individual considers to be important when faced with a moral 
statement (Graham et al., 2011; Zhang, Hook & Johnson, 2016). 
The standard version of the questionnaire is the MFQ30. It contains thirty-two 
questions with six questions or statements for each moral foundation and two control 
items made to catch and disqualify any respondent not answering sincerely. The 
questionnaire is also divided into two parts. In the first sixteen questions the participant 
is asked to rate the level of relevancy of a statement or consideration when determining 
whether something is morally right or wrong. The following sixteen items are 
statements in which the participant is asked to rate their level of agreement. The sum 
total for each foundation is then calculated and can be analysed in context (Graham et 
al., 2011). 
The original validation study for the MFQ examined the relevance, relations, and 
consistency of the instrument through exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. 
The external validity of this instrument was then explored by comparing each 
foundations relation to other verified scales. For example, the Care foundation was 
compared with the Empathy subscales from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, the 
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Psychopathy Scale as well as several items from the Good-Self Assessment and the 
Schwartz Value Scale (SVS) items for Benevolence; Fairness and Ingroup Loyalty 
were also compared with the Good-Self Scale and the SVS; the Authority foundation 
was validated in comparison the Right-Wing Authoritarianism, the SVS as well as the 
Progressive and Traditional Justice scale; Sanctity was compared to the SVS, self-
reported religious attendance, and the Disgust Scale (Graham et al., 2011). In this 
study Graham et al. (2011) found the MFQ to be consistent, reliable, and valid. 
However, it should be noted that later studies have had a hard time replicating these 
results, especially in cross-cultural samples and with translated questionnaires (Davis 
et al., 2016; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2014; Bobbio, Nencini, & Sarrica, 2011; Dogruel, 
Joeckel, & Bowman, 2013; Kim, Kang, & Yun, 2012; Kivikangas, Lönnqvist, & 
Ravaja, 2017; Zhang & Li, 2015). 
 
2.4. Prominent critiques  
Even though the MFT has had a significant impact on moral psychology, the theory is 
not without its problems and has encountered both theoretical, empirical and some 
ideological critique.  
Miles and Vaisey (2015) criticised the MFT for failing to incorporate a broader 
theoretical base. They argued that utilising the moral constructs of several theories 
should give a better and more coherent explanation of the political variation observed 
when comparing MFT to political orientation. Also, the MFT cannot explain whether 
the moral foundations explain political affiliation or vice versa.  
Researchers have also questioned the endeavour of Haidt et al. to incorporate the 
conservative virtues of loyalty, authority, and purity into their model. The argument 
is that previous research within political psychology associate these virtues with 
authoritarian personality characteristics. And considering these as valid moral 
concerns in order to broaden the scientific concept of morality might not be wise since 
it might lead authoritarian tendencies to be perceived as more acceptable, even though 
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these virtues are associated with intergroup hostility and discrimination. Now, this 
argument does not really question the MFT model itself, but rather its politics (Kugler, 
Jost & Noorbaloochi, 2014). 
The main criticism of the MFT is the lack of empirical evidence for its evolutionary 
and neurological claims, as these can be seen more as general speculation that 
theoretical premise. Thus, the assumptions on intuitional innateness become 
problematic. Furthermore, the MFTs taxonomy seems deliberately created on a post 
hoc basis rather than based on empirical analysis as the theory has excluded good 
candidates for moral foundations. As such Suhler and Churchlands (2011) critique 
boils down to three main points. First, the assumptions of moral innateness and 
modularity are not proven and thus should not be utilised in support of the theory. 
Second, there might be additional foundational candidates which have not been 
explored thoroughly and this question the legitimacy of the model. Third, the MFT 
fails to bridge theory with neural- and genetical science even though it claims to do 
so.  
The MFQ-instruments validity and reliability has been questioned as well. First, the 
factor structure and measures of internal consistency in Graham et al. (2011) were less 
than optimal and several studies have had the same problem with lacking internal 
consistency of the MFQ (Bobbio, Nencini, & Sarrica, 2011; Dogruel, Joeckel, & 
Bowman, 2013; Kim, Kang, & Yun, 2012; Kivikangas, Lönnqvist, & Ravaja, 2017; 
Zhang & Li, 2015). A few more recent factor analyses have also shown the five-factor 
model to have an even worse fit than the original validation study indicated even 
though this model certainly offers the best fit estimate for the time being (Davis et al., 
2016; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2014). 
Several studies have had problems with replicating the MFT hypotheses cross-
culturally. For example, Davis et al. (2016) could not replicate the original MFT 
findings in their Afro-American sample. In this study the binding foundations did not 
correlate with conservatism as strongly in Black samples as it did among Whites in 
the US. Along the same lines, Zhang and Li (2015) reported problems when examining 
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the MFT in a Chinese sample, where the questionnaire items about God apparently 
did not correspond well with their Buddhist cultural roots.   
Conclusively, the MFT remains a popular framework exploring the connection 
between morality and politics despite of its theoretical and methodological 
shortcomings. And will most likely stay as such until a stronger theory takes its place. 
The researchers of MFT (Graham et al., 2013) have responded to several of these 
criticisms and have acknowledged that, while the five-factor structure of the MFT is 
quite strongly supported by empirical evidence it is not final and is to be considered a 
work in progress. For example, Liberty (Ivyer et al, 2012; Haidt, 2012) is a candidate 
foundation that might be implemented into the theory and other suggestions as well as 
critical discussion are welcome. 
 
3. THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM 
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of how political ideologies are 
represented and measured. I will also review how morality is used to explain political 
differences and finally discuss how the MFT has been implemented to explore political 
identity.  
 
3.1. Political ideology and political identity 
People tend to categorise themselves into political labels such as liberal, conservative, 
or socialist. Many studies have examined this phenomenon of political identification 
by examining how people self-identify politically and how these identifications 
intertwine with personality traits and values (Jost et al., 2003; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; 
Schwartz, 2010). These political identities are often visualised as placed on a spectrum 
in accordance to the values that they reflect. In the US, the political spectrum is usually 
portrayed as a single bipolar dimension with liberal-left on one side and conservative-
right on the other. This spectrum roughly translates to the value antagonism of 
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liberalism/socialism vs capitalism/conservatism (Eysenck, 1954). While this may 
work in the US and be reflective of the political system there, this conceptualisation 
lacks the nuance of the political systems in the rest of the world. Some argue that a 
multidimensional system with separate measures for social and economic issues better 
describe the spectrum of political identity and values (Kerlinger, 1984; Feldman, 
2003). From the MFT perspective Haidt et al. (2009) research also suggests that a one-
dimensional conceptualisation poorly captures the whole spectrum of political 
identity. Furthermore, this research suggests that the moral dimension of politics 
clearly goes beyond the simple distinction of liberal-left and conservative-right.  
Definitionally, ideological conservatism promotes traditional social institutions and 
regards tradition, hierarchy, and respect for authority as virtues. Conservatism 
prioritises social stability over liberties such as personal freedoms. Liberalism, in 
contrast, emphasises individual freedom and equal rights in society. This antagonism 
has also been described as the degree of which an individual resist or advocates social 
change. In turn, the right is associated with acceptance of inequality within an 
economic context, which implies that social hierarchies are inevitable and even natural 
in any society. Within this context, inequality is viewed as a result of natural social 
differences and even as a precondition for a free market economy and as such 
perceived as fair in proportion to what an individual can contribute with. The 
ideological left is defined as supporting economic egalitarianism and is 
interchangeable with socialism in many cases. For the left, caring for those who are 
perceived as disadvantaged in society by means redistributing wealth and policies of 
privilege is seen as a virtue. This left-right antagonism can be summarised as the 
degree of which an individual accepts inequality (Bobbio, 1997; Feldman, 2013; Jost, 
Federico, & Napier, 2009; McLean, McMillian & Alistair, 2009; Schwartz, Capara & 
Vecchione, 2010; Schwartz et al. 2014).  
Socialism, the left and liberalism as well as the right, and conservatism are sometimes 
used synonymously and even interchangeably (Feldman, 2013; Feldman & Johnston, 
2013). Even though these concepts and identities are sometimes intertwined, studies 
have found a two-dimensional structure with separate measures for economic and 
social values to be quite reflective of the underlying values (Schwartz, 1990). 
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For the clarity of this study liberalism and conservatism are considered as the social 
value spectrum concerning individual rights and freedoms, while the left and right will 
represent the economic value spectrum concerning ones acceptance of inequality and 
the need for redistribution of wealth, if not stated otherwise.  
 
3.2. Political self-identification 
Political identity, identification or ideological orientation is often measured by 
utilising a self-placement scale, where the respondent places herself on the spectrum 
as she sees fit. The measurement scales are often bipolar or two-dimensional and 
represent either the liberal-conservative spectrum, the left-right spectrum or both. 
Simple and straightforward as this operationalisation is, it still has its problems. 
Mainly that self-reported ideological or political orientation or identity might not 
always correspond well with views on actual political issues or practice or even with 
values, but rather with group identification (Jost, 2006; Jost, Federico & Napier., 2009; 
Feldman, 2013; Hibbing, Smith & Alford, 2014). 
Ellis and Stimson (2012) refers to this disparity between political identification and 
operationalisation as symbolic vs operational ideology. Their research shows that 
many who identify as conservatives on paper are likely to endorse liberal policies in 
practice while simultaneously maintaining their conservative identity. Therefore, the 
validity of the self-placement measure is questionable at best, but the clarity and 
simplicity of this instrument has made it a very popular way of measuring political 
orientation. It does, however, predict voting behaviour very accurately (Jost, 2006; 
Jost et al., 2009).  
As shortly mentioned earlier, research suggests that a two-dimensional representation 
of the political spectrum is superior to a unidimensional one when studying political 
identity. This multidimensional conceptualisation makes room for heterogeneity and 
nuance beyond the simple unidimensional measure. Libertarianism, for example, 
combines values from the economic right and social liberalism. This and other latent 
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classes may be more obscured in a unidimensional analysis. Thus, the two-
dimensional instrument with one measure for social values and another for economical 
values is preferable (Feldman & Johnston, 2013). 
 
3.3. Political ideology and the MFT 
Individual variation in political ideology is often attributed to differences in class, 
demographics, culture, and experiences during adolescence etc. (Baldassarri & 
Bearman, 2007; Davis & Robinson, 1996; McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Weeden & 
Grusky, 2012; Wright & Boudet, 2012). These qualities are, of course, dynamically 
intertwined with human morality, even though there seems to be no consensus of 
which moral differences matter the most and to which degree (Graham et al., 2009; 
Hunter, 1991; Koleva et al., 2012; Lakoff, 2002; Schwartz et al., 2010). Political 
orientation, like morality, is clearly dependent on individual, inherent and cultural 
differences that affect our psychological underpinnings. This way, both political 
orientation and morality is considered as built upon our inherent psychological 
structures but also affected by outside influences (Feldman, 2013, Jost et al., 2003; 
Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Jost et al, 2009). 
One of the most prominent implementations of the MFT is to utilise it to explain and 
predict political identification of groups and individuals. In these MFT studies liberals 
tend to value the foundations in the individualising cluster over the ones in the binding 
cluster while conservatives usually form a more even MFT profile with all five 
foundations being represented quite equally. Thus, it can be implied that liberals lean 
toward a more universalist morality while conservatives are more sensitive to the 
moral compass of the in-group (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011; 
Koleva et al., 2012). 
This dualism has been observed in several studies. However, most studies have 
employed a political self-placement instrument, and this begs the question whether 
real values corresponding with operational ideology have been measured, or rather 
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just symbolic ideology corresponding with identification (Davies, Sibley & Liu, 2014; 
Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu & Peterson, 2010; Lewis & Bates, 2011). 
Political liberals have been found to score higher in the individualising foundations, 
harm and fairness. Conservatives, while holding harm and fairness in relatively high 
regard, score slightly higher on loyalty and much higher on authority as well as 
sanctity (Graham, Nosek & Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 2011, Graham et al., 2009). 
The tendency for liberals to adhere to the individualizing cluster in their moral 
reasoning and regard the remaining dimensions as secondary. In comparison, 
conservative individuals care more about the dimensions of loyalty, authority and 
sanctity. However, conservatives do consider the individualizing cluster as well, but 
in a more balanced manner (Graham et al. 2011; Haidt, 2012; Nilsson et al. 2015; 
Davies et al. 2014). Empirically, the moralizing process does vary among cultures, 
but less than between social classes and age. However, there does seem to be a trend 
for traditional and collectivist societies to be more attuned to the binding, community 
and group related, moral foundations. In contrast, members of WEIRD societies are 
more sensitive to the individualistic clusters of fairness, harm and care when 
moralizing. WEIRD societies also tend to distinguish between harm-inflicting moral 
violations, and violations of etiquette or social codes of conduct. In these societies the 
latter is often viewed as less severe (Graham et al. 2011; Haidt et al. 1993; Haidt, 
2012).  
The research culturally closest to the present study are the studies by Nilsson and 
Erlandsson (2014) and Kivikangas, Lönnqvist & Ravaja (2017). Nilsson and 
Erlandsson measured Swedish students by MFQ (N = 540), political identity by self-
placement, and system justification (e.g. Nilsson & Jost, 2012; Kay & Jost, 2003) in 
order to explore the structural validity of the MFT as well as its relation to political 
ideology. The results were consistent with Graham et al. (2011) and indicated the five-
factor model to be better than the two-factor model of the MFT. Furthermore, it seems 
that harm and fairness decrease, and loyalty, authority and sanctity increase as political 
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identity moves from left to right (Fig. 2). Also, fairness and authority were the 
strongest predictors of political identity in this sample. Kivikangas et al. used a 
representative Finnish sample (N = 874). The respondents completed the MFQ and 
two single-item measures of political self-placement on a left-right and liberal-
conservative scale. In this study the left-right dimension corresponded with all 
foundations except sanctity and conservatism was associated with the binding 
foundations. The research supports the claim that the two political scales are not 
comparable in some countries and thus political orientation is better measured 
multidimensionally. 
The largest study on MFT and political orientation to date was undertaken by Haidt, 
Graham and Joseph (2009). They used the database on YourMorals.org with a large 
sample (N=20962) of US born individuals to identify several MFT clustering models 
and compared these based on demographical data, Big Five (BF), Schwartz Value 
Survey (SVS) several moral and ideological measures. The automatic cluster analysis 
produced a two-cluster model with distinct liberal/conservative profiles. This provided 
support for the findings in other MFT studies in relation to political identity (e.g. 
Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009).  
Figure 2. Moral foundations across political identity from left to right in Nilsson & Erlandsson 2014. 
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In subsequent analyses both three- and four-cluster models where observed. The three-
cluster solution showed a third group whose profile differed from the liberal and 
conservative groups in the two-cluster solution and the four-cluster solution revealed 
yet another group, and this solution was seen as the most interesting since it also 
contained all previous groupings.  
 
Figure 3. MFT clusters and political identity from Haidt et al. 2009. 
 
The groups in the four-cluster model (Fig. 3) corresponded with the self-reported 
political identity scale (1 being very liberal and 7 most conservative) almost linearly, 
with the first cluster coming in as very liberal (M=1.92), the second cluster as liberal 
(M=2.63), the third cluster as somewhat conservative (M=3.31) and the fourth cluster 
a as quite conservative (M=4.99). This cluster had the highest average scores in Harm 
and Fairness, and very low scores in Ingroup Loyalty, Authority and Purity. This 
cluster scored highest in BF Openness to Experience, and the lowest in Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientations. Furthermore, people in this and 
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the second cluster were twice as likely to identify as atheist than people in clusters 
three and four. The fourth cluster was almost the total opposite; very high scores in 
Ingroup Loyalty, Authority and Purity, but the lowest scores in Harm and Fairness. 
Low scores in Openness to Experience and the highest scores on Right Wing 
Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and Religiosity. The second and 
third clusters combined aspects from both previous prototypical liberal/conservative 
clusters but also demonstrated that go beyond and above the left/right perspective. For 
example, the second cluster had the highest scores on Schwartz’s (1990) Hedonism 
value and was very accepting of issues condemned by the conservative cluster, such 
as abortion, homosexuality, gambling and tax evasion. Haidt et al. (2009) classified 
this cluster as libertarian because of its opposition to imposed moral regulations. Both 
middle clusters were seen as providing support to the notion that political ideology 
cannot be captured on a left-right dimension. Rather, separate dimensions for social 
and economic issues seem appropriate (Haidt et al., 2009). 
So empirically, the moralizing process does vary among cultures, but less than 
between social classes and age. However, there does seem to be a trend for traditional 
and collectivist societies to be more attuned to the binding, community and group 
related, moral foundations. In contrast, members of WEIRD societies are more 
sensitive to the individualistic clusters of fairness, harm and care when moralizing. 
WEIRD societies also tend to distinguish between harm-inflicting moral violations, 
and violations of etiquette or social codes of conduct. In these societies the latter is 
often viewed as less severe (Graham et al. 2011; Haidt et al. 1993; Haidt, 2012).  
Conclusively, there are empirically distinct MFT profiles that correspond with 
political self-placement and several psychometric measures of traits and values 
including the BF and SVS. However, the MFT profiles tend to replicate badly in cross-
cultural samples. A two-dimensional bipolar measure for political identity is the most 
used operationalisation of political ideology and should fit well with use of the MFQ 
despite of its critiques.  
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4. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
My goal is to explore the values of FNDU students through the MFQ instrument and 
uncover whether the MFT holds even in unexplored populations such as military 
academy students. As MFT is aptly used to predict political identification by moral 
profiling, cluster analysis of the MFT data followed by an analysis of variance is a 
good approach that mimics the Haidt et al. (2009) model, where clusters where first 
identified using the MFQ and then explored and compared utilising a political self-
placement measurement. 
The first aim of this study is to gain insight into how military personnel moralise. To 
do this I will use the MFQ instrument to explore the values of the FNDU students and 
see how the sample clusters. This will reveal indications of typical MFT profiles 
among aspiring military officers. The second goal is to see how these cluster profiles 
lie on the political spectrum. This is achieved by examining two political self-
placement instruments and exploring the variations between the clusters. 
Since there appears to be no published research on how the MFT and political identity 
works within military samples, my research questions and hypotheses must rely on the 
base of research on civilian populations. Hence, my research is perhaps best viewed 
through a semi-exploratory lens. 
 
Research questions. 
Regarding the twofold goals of this study my research questions are the following: 
1. What kinds of MFT profiles can be identified in the military student sample? 
2. How do the clusters typically identify on the political spectrum? 
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Hypotheses. 
Empirical evidence suggests that MFQ results tend to group into four main clusters in 
WEIRD populations (Haidt et al., 2009). One liberal cluster with high scores in harm 
and fairness, a second cluster reminiscent of a conservative profile with more evenly 
distributed scores for all foundations and two smaller clusters, a conservative and a 
libertarian. The FNDU students certainly fit into the WEIRD category and I think a 
four-cluster solution is a reasonable expectation for this study: One conservative 
cluster and a liberal one with two smaller clusters representative of the libertarian as 
well as a sanctity/conservatism-oriented cluster reflective of the Haidt et al. (2009) 
clusters. I expect all clusters to place themselves as research would predict: the liberal-
type MFT cluster will identify as left-liberal and the conservative-type MFT cluster as 
right-conservative. The libertarian cluster will place as liberal-right and the sanctity-
conservatism-oriented cluster will have a similar political profile as the conservative 
cluster but to a less prominent degree. 
The popular belief is that military individuals are more conservative and authoritarian 
than the general population. Why then, is it reasonable to expect a near replication of 
previous, civilian, studies even in a military population? First, Finland is considered 
one of the most egalitarian and liberal societies in the world. As such, it is fair to 
assume that this reflects upon the FNDU as well. Corresponding with the first point, 
Finland employs mandatory military service for all men and regular refresher training 
for reservists. The service is optional but increasingly popular among women as well. 
This brings the military closer to the general civil society and I expect this to have an 
effect of the representativeness and plurality of all Finnish military organisations, 
including the FNDU. Thus, I do not expect the FNDU sample to vary significantly 
from the general population on the MFQ or political identification scales.  
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Hence, my hypotheses are the following: 
1. There will be two main clusters and two smaller clusters: one conservative and 
a liberal one, and a smaller conservative and a libertarian cluster, which all 
form according to the MFT.  
2. These clusters will affiliate with political self-placement in accordance with 
the MFT; The clusters with high individualising fundaments will identify as 
predominantly left-liberal, and the clusters with higher group binding 
fundaments will identify as right-conservative. The libertarian cluster will hold 
liberal-right values. 
 
5. METHOD 
This chapter’s goal is to present the method and procedure of this study in detail. All 
instruments and subsequent analyses conducted will be introduced along with the 
ethical perspective.  
 
5.1. Procedure 
Data was collected on MFT, demographic and political self-placement variables. The 
survey can be viewed in detail in Appendix A. After the data collection, it was coded 
into a database for easier processing. A two-step cluster analysis was conducted, and 
the best model determined by observing the Bayesian information criteria as well as 
the theoretical reference frame.  
The clusters were named and analysed. Following the analysis, a test of homogeneity 
of variances was conducted to ensure that the clusters were comparable. An ANOVA 
was conducted to analyse the association of the clusters and the two political self-
placement variables, as this is one of the main applications of the MFT instrument. 
Any significant differences observed, were analysed via the Tukey HSD post-hoc test, 
in order to see which groups are significantly different from one another. 
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5.2. Participants and survey 
The survey sample (N = 167) consisted of Finnish first year military cadettes from the 
FNDU.  The questionnaire included the standardised 30 item moral foundations 
questionnaire (MFQ30) which was translated into Finnish. Demographic data was 
collected through several instruments. The survey included a rudimentary battery for 
childhood home income, number of children, civil status, age, specific study program, 
and gender. Before use, the translated questionnaire was piloted on several native 
Finnish-speakers and iterated upon to minimise any nuance lost in translation. To 
summarize, this study utilises the political self-placement instrument as well as the 
MFQ30 and is to be considered person oriented. 
As most of the participants in the survey were men (93.4 %) this sample is not 
representative of any civilian population with regards to gender. However, it is 
representative of the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) overall, as women constitute only 
6.6 % of the non-commissioned officers and 2,4 % of the officers in all branches 
combined (FDF, 2017). The consequences that this gender discrepancy may have for 
my conclusions and further research will be discussed later.  
 
5.2.1. MFQ30 design and consistency  
All participants completed the MFQ30, which consists of 30 questions measuring the 
moral foundations (six items for each foundation), and two catch questions designed 
to remove people not responding seriously. The questionnaire utilises a Likert-type 
scale from zero to five (0 = disagree, 5 = completely agree), commonly used for 
psychometric test questionnaires. Each MFT parameter is measured by six questions 
for each of the foundations. The MFQ30 is further divided into two segments. The 
first presents questions like “When you decide whether something is right or wrong, 
to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking? Whether 
someone was harmed or not?” and the second presenting statements such as “Please 
MORAL FOUNDATIONS AND POLITICAL IDENTITY  
32 
 
read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement. If I were a 
soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey anyway 
because that is my duty.” This last statement was purposefully changed from the 
original MFT30 in order to fit the military context better. In the original survey the 
statement starts with “If I was a soldier…” whereas the FNDU survey modified it to 
“As a soldier it is my duty…”. 
Measures of internal consistency (Cronbach α) of the translated MFQ30 instrument 
six-item subscales used in this study ranged from poor to reasonable (Harm , α = .690, 
Fairness, α = .570, Loyalty, α = .595, Authority, α = .618, Sanctity, α = .653). The 
internal consistency of the MFQ30 instrument as a whole was reasonable (α = .663). 
This would indicate is a poorer internal consistency than reported in the original 
validation study (Graham et al. 2011), which gave an average subscale α ranging from 
.65-.84.  This is hardly unexpected, since many studies using translated measures have 
reported poor (α < .60) or unacceptable (α < .50) levels of internal consistency of their 
MFQ instruments (Bobbio et al., 2011; Dogruel et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2012; Zhang 
& Li, 2015).  
 
Example items from each foundation. 
The Harm foundation was measured with statements such as “Whether or not someone 
cared for someone weak or vulnerable” in the first part, and “It can never be right to 
kill a human being” in the second part.  
Fairness was measured with statements such as “Whether or not someone acted 
unfairly” in the first part, and “When the government makes laws, the number one 
principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly” in the second part.  
Loyalty was measured with statements such as “Whether or not someone did 
something to betray his or her group” for the first part, and “It is more important to be 
a team player than to express oneself” in the second part.  
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Authority was measured with statements such as “Whether or not an action caused 
chaos or disorder” for the first part, and “As a soldier, it is my duty to obey my 
commanding officer´s orders even if I disagree with them” for the second part. 
Purity was measured with statements such as “Whether or not someone acted I a way 
that God would approve of” for the first part, and “I would call some acts wrong on 
the grounds that they are unnatural” for the second part.  
 
5.2.2. Political self-placement 
Political self-identification was measured through two items on a 1-6 Likert-type self-
placement scale. The first item concentrated on the participants political believes on a 
spectrum from left to right regarding economic issues, e.g. taxation and social welfare. 
The second item focused on social issues and values on a similar liberal-conservative 
spectrum, e.g. homosexual marriage and immigration. In both questions lower 
numbers indicated a more liberal or leftist approach whereas a higher number 
indicated a more conservative or right-wing approach. 
In all its simplicity this instrument is crude one, and self-placement is a problematic 
type of operationalisation since it is prone to several types of reporting biases. 
However, political self-placement is frequently used in both psychometric tests as well 
as political and societal surveys, making it the standard measurement for political 
affiliation despite its shortcomings.  
 
5.3. Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis is basically pattern recognition and grouping. Within this concept, we 
measure similarity, form clusters, and decide on the number of clusters that best 
represent and explain the structure of the sample.  However, the cluster concept is not 
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steadily defined and might vary greatly depending on which clustering algorithm is 
utilised (Hair et al., 2014; Joseph et al., 2010). 
Cluster analysis may use several classification techniques to group subjects based on 
logical test functions so that subjects in a cluster all share similar characteristics but 
differs from the other clustered group(s) in the sample. In other words, cluster analysis 
is an attempt to maximise homogeneity inside the clusters while simultaneously 
maximising heterogeneity between the clusters. Thus, cluster analysis is a comparison 
of objects based on the determined variate, not an estimation of the variate itself (Hair 
et al., 2014; Joseph et al., 2010).  
This technique is mainly used for identifying natural groups within the data, analysing 
groups of similar observations instead of individual observations, and identifying 
implicit relationships within the data. Sample size itself does not constitute any 
statistical inference issues for cluster analysis. However, the sample size must 
naturally be large enough to provide adequate representation of small groups within 
the population. Otherwise the underlying structure might not be represented properly 
in the model (Hair et al., 2014). 
Combined approach, such as the two-step cluster analysis that is used in this study, 
uses a quick non-hierarchical algorithm for pre clustering the data and then relies on 
hierarchical methods for the final cluster solution. The two-step analysis is mainly an 
exploratory tool to reveal natural groupings within the sample (Hair et al. 2014).  
How then, do we determine the adequate number of clusters for the final model? Any 
hierarchical method will result in an unspecified interval - starting with a one-cluster 
model and ending with a one-data-point-member-cluster model. As we move from 
one-member clusters toward the one-cluster, heterogeneity will increase within the 
clusters. While we aim to get a simple and representative structure, we must 
simultaneously assure that the groupings remain as homogenous as possible. A 
disproportionally large increase in heterogeneity when the number of clusters decrease 
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indicate that dissimilar clusters have been merged, which is something we aim to avoid 
in order to get an informative model (Hair et al., 2014). In this study, the most 
explanatory number of clusters will be automatically determined by the SPSS two-
step algorithm using the Bayesian Information Criterion and logarithmic likelihood 
distance measure, and then analysed through the theoretical reference frame.  
It is worth noting that cluster analysis is descriptive, atheoretical, and noninferential 
(Hair et al., 2014, p. 419). In other words, clustering does not rely on any statistical 
basis that enables drawing inferences from any sample to a whole population. As such, 
it is mainly regarded as an exploratory technique. Cluster analysis will create clusters 
even in the absence of an existing structural pattern within the sample, and the 
emergence of clusters within a sample does not validate their existence without a 
strong conceptual frame of reference.  
 
5.4. Analysis of variance and post hoc testing 
ANOVA gives a measure of the sample’s total variability by the sum of squared 
differences of the cases from their mean. It is possible to further investigate the total 
sum of squares by dividing them with the components that are causing the variation. 
After the components of all specified sources for the variation have been confirmed, 
the remaining sum of squares is attributed to random variation. Hence, ANOVA is 
used to determine if there are statistically significant differences between two or more 
means. This analysis works in the basis of a non-specific null hypothesis. Thus, one 
may only conclude whether there are differences between the means or not, not 
necessarily which exact means that differ from one another (Hair et al., 2014, Tukey, 
1949; Upton & Cook, 2014). 
Thus, post hoc testing becomes necessary. Post hoc tests are used as a second stage to 
complement the ANOVA. John Tukey developed the Honestly Significantly Different 
test (HSD) to compare several means pairwise. This test builds on studentised range 
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distribution, which tests the difference between the smallest and largest means. This 
method is like t-distribution but may utilise more than two means for comparison. The 
HSD-test will give information on which exact means that differ significantly (Tukey, 
1949). 
 
5.5. Ethics 
The main ethical concerns for this study are to follow scientific standards and to abide 
by the FNDU research permission contract (Appendix B. Contract no. AP22426) that 
was required to access the sample data.  
The standards of anonymity and confidentiality have been considered in order to 
minimise the risk of harm to any participants. Before the actual survey, a presentation 
of the study and what the data may be used for - publications, presentations, and 
conferences - was given to ensure informed consent. After the data encoding all cases 
where anonymised and any personal information disclosed by the participants was 
deleted from the digital records. The data is used only and explicitly for this study, 
and no part of the sample data shall be handed to third parties.  
The FNDU has granted rights to use the value survey MFQ sample for this study. 
However, there are several reservations. Most importantly, the requirements for proper 
data storage and the right to withdraw the data if any reservations are violated. And of 
course, proper scientific conduct and high standards of honesty in reporting, careful 
analysis, methodological transparency, sufficient validation of test results, proper 
crediting of sources, and genuine collaboration with peers shall be upheld. As the 
FNDU research- and ethics committee has reviewed and accepted the research plan, 
the study’s premises should all be in proper order.  
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6. RESULTS 
An overview of the samples descriptive data and demographics is given in this chapter. 
Then the results of the clustering process along with the political self-placement 
ANOVA and post hoc testing are presented.  
 
6.1. Descriptive data, demographics, and correlations 
The whole survey sample (N=167) was relatively young (M = 22, SD = 1.47) and 
consisted mainly of men (93.4 %). The questionnaire included political self-placement 
instruments on a scale from 1-6 with the sample mean positioning as centre-right (M 
= 4.33, SD = .91) concerning economical values and centre-liberal (M = 3.51, SD = 
1.21) regarding social values, with some degree of variance. 
Pearson product-moment correlations (Tab. 1) were performed to give an overview of 
the data. Of the individualising foundations, only fairness had a significant negative 
correlation with the political measures of social conservatism (r (165) = -.158, p = 
.042) and right-wing economic policies (r (165) = -.258, p = <.001). All binding 
foundations except purity had significant positive correlations with conservatism 
(Loyalty r (165) = .278, p = <.000, Authority r (165) = .392, p = <.000) and rightism 
(Loyalty r (165) = .171, p = .027, Authority r (165) = .164, p = .034). Furthermore, 
this sample presents the same tendency for the foundations themselves as previous 
research, where the individualising and binding foundations correlate negatively with 
each other but positively within their higher order cluster. The only anomaly being 
Sanctity, which had high significant correlations with all other foundations. 
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  ECONOMIC SOCIAL HARM FAIRNESS LOYALTY AUTHORITY SANCTITY 
ECONOMIC 1 .254** -0.085 -.158* .171* .164* -0.065 
SOCIAL .254** 1 -0.048 -.258** .278** .392** .227** 
HARM -0.085 -0.048 1 .556** .193* 0.012 .456** 
FAIRNESS -.158* -.258** .556** 1 0.017 -0.072 .282** 
LOYALTY .171* .278** .193* 0.017 1 .565** .359** 
AUTHORITY .164* .392** 0.012 -0.072 .565** 1 .403** 
SANCTITY -0.065 .227** .456** .282** .359** .403** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 1. Correlations of MFT and political values. 
 
6.2. Clustering logic 
First, the items concerning each moral foundation were coded into standardised mean 
variables. These were then used in a two-step cluster analysis in SPSS based on the 
logarithmic-likelihood distance measure. The clusters were first automatically 
determined with 15 as maximum number of clusters. Both the Schwarz’s Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) were utilised 
for cross reference and the elbow argument was used to then deduct the best model. 
This automatic clustering model leaned towards a four-cluster model, with no outlier 
cluster and a fair fit considering cluster silhouette and separation. Both the BIC and 
AIC values and changes consistently indicated toward this four-cluster model. 
However, the changes were not that significant and a two or three-cluster model might 
have been considered almost equally good. Two more analyses were conducted with 
the specified number two and three clusters respectively, with the conclusion that the 
four-cluster model appears to be the most informative and certainly the best with 
regard for cluster homogeneity and inter cluster heterogeneity.  
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This model yielded clusters of increasing size (C1 12.6 %, C2 29.9 %, C3 22.8 %, C4 
34.7 %) with a fair cluster quality by silhouette measure of cohesion and separation. 
Purity was the most important predictor of cluster membership, with Fairness and 
Harm as equally good secondary predictors. 
 
6.3. Cluster characteristics 
The sample means were relatively low for Harm (M = 2.89, SD = .75), moderate for 
Fairness (M = 3.34, SD = .57), high in Loyalty (M = 3.70, SD = .56) and Authority (M 
= 3.40, SD = .57), and comparatively low for Purity (M = 2.50, SD = .68). All clusters 
had high scores in Loyalty and Authority (Tab. 2). The main predictors for cluster 
membership were Sanctity, Fairness and Harm.  
 
HARM FAIRNESS LOYALTY AUTHORITY SANCTITY 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
C1 3.17 0.52 3.74 0.41 3.52 0.4 3.03 0.38 2.43 0.62 
C2 2.55 0.5 2.92 0.36 3.78 0.53 3.64 0.42 2.54 0.39 
C3 3.49 0.51 3.61 0.35 4.14 0.38 3.89 0.38 3.15 0.38 
C4 1.87 0.69 2.79 0.58 3.18 0.67 2.91 0.6 1.4 0.32 
Sample  2.89 0.75 3.34 0.57 3.7 0.56 3.39 0.57 2.5 0.68 
 
The first cluster (n = 58) had relatively high scores in Harm (M = 3.17, SD = .52), and 
Fairness (M = 3.74, SD = .41) compared to the sample means. However, Loyalty (M 
= 3.52, SD = .40) scores were moderate but lower than the sample mean. Authority 
(M = 3.03, SD = .38) and Sanctity (M = 2.43, SD = .62) were also lower than the 
sample mean. As this cluster was comparatively sensitive to the Harm and Fairness 
foundations but also scored moderately in Loyalty and on the political spectrum this 
cluster had the most leftist but still quite moderate economic value mean (M = 4.17, 
Table 2.  Clusters, MFT Means and Standard Variation of the sample. 
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SD = 1.03) and very liberal social value means (M = 3.07, SD = 1.27) it was aptly 
named the Loyal-Liberal cluster (Fig 4 & 5). 
The second cluster’s (n = 50) general nominator was Authority (M = 3.64, SD = .42). 
Harm (M = 2.55, SD = .50) and Fairness (M = 2.92, SD = 0.36) were significantly 
lower than the sample mean. On the political spectrum this cluster was the most right- 
wing economically (M = 4.46, SD = .81) and conservative socially (M = 3.96, SD = 
1.05) This cluster was named the Authoritative-Conservative cluster (Fig 4 & 5). 
The third cluster (n = 38) scored high in all foundations, with the exception for 
Fairness which was still higher than the sample mean. This cluster had the 
significantly higher Sanctity (M = 3.15, SD = .38) scores than the other clusters was 
most reminiscent of Haidt et al. (2009) Religious-Left cluster on the MFT scales. 
However, this clusters political profile was relatively rightist economically (M = 4.38, 
SD = .79) and conservative socially (M = 3.84, SD = 1.09), but less so than the 
Authoritative-Conservative cluster. Henceforth called the Loyal-Conservative cluster. 
(Fig 4 & 5). 
The fourth cluster (n = 21) was the smallest cluster and scored significantly lower in 
all foundations compared to the other clusters. Furthermore, it was particularly 
unsensitive to the Harm (M = 1.87, SD = .69) and Sanctity (M = 1.40, SD = .38) 
foundations. On the political scales this cluster was economically moderately rightist 
(M = 4.38, SD = .97) but the most socially liberal (M = 3.05, SD = 1.07). As this 
cluster is quite unsensitive to all foundations, but very uncondemning and liberal 
socially it fitted the characteristics of the libertarian political profile found by Haidt et 
al. (2009) and was christened the Libertarian cluster (Fig 4 & 5). 
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Figure 5. Moral foundations. Standardised by sample means. 
Figure 4. Moral foundations means of each cluster. 
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6.4. Analysis of variance 
A one-way between subjects’ ANOVA was conducted to compare the association of 
political self-placement and cluster inhesion. There was an insignificant association 
between economical values and cluster membership (F (3,162) = 0.975, p = 0.406). 
However, there was a small significant association between social values and cluster 
membership (F (3,162) = 7.622, p < .000) (Fig. 6; Tab. 3). 
Post-hoc comparisons on social values using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
means of the Loyal-Liberal cluster (M = 3.07, SD = 1.27) and the Libertarian (M = 
3.05, SD = 1.07) cluster were significantly different from the Authoritarian-
Conservative cluster (M = 3.96, SD = 1.05) and the Loyal-Conservative cluster (M = 
3.84, SD = 1.09). However, the Authoritarian-Conservative cluster and the Loyal-
Conservative cluster did not significantly differ on social values amongst themselves, 
as did not the Loyal-Liberal cluster and the Libertarian cluster. Conclusively, the 
results suggest that there is a significant observable difference in social values 
dependant on the MFT profile, and that the data may be divided into two main groups 
based on this value measurement (Fig. 6; Tab. 3). 
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Figure 6. Political self-placement of the clusters. 
Table 3. ANOVA results on political orientation. A profile mean is significantly different from another mean within 
the same row if they have different superscripts. A mean without a superscript is not significantly different from 
any other mean. 
Mean SD M SD M SD M SD M SD F(3,162) p η2
Social 3.51 1.21 3.07a 1.27 3.96b 1.05 3.84b 1.09 3.05a 1.07 7.622 <.000 0.124
Economic 4.33 0.91 4.17 1.03 4.46 0.81 4.38 0.79 4.38 0.97 0.975 0.406 0.018
Sample Loyal-Liberal
Authoritarian-
Conservative
Loyal-
Conservative
Libertarian
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7. DISCUSSION 
This chapter’s purpose is to summarise the results, discuss the relevance and 
limitations of this study, and point toward future research possibilities. 
 
7.1. Limitations and future research 
Even though this study reached its goals in examining the functionality if the MFT in 
a military population, it naturally has its limitations.  
First, the MFQ was translated from English to Finnish, and even though the 
questionnaire was piloted before there are certain nuances that are hard to get right. 
This inevitably reflects upon the validity and reliability of the results and more studies 
are needed to confirm the reliability of the translated instrument. Especially as there 
is evidence to suggest that translated MFQ measures do have replicational problems, 
which were reflected in the internal consistency of the translated MFQ30 version 
utilised in this study as well (Bobbio et al., 2011; Dogruel et al., 2013; Kim et al., 
2012; Zhang & Li, 2015). Generally, a Cronbach’s α of > .70 is considered the cut-off 
point as a measure of internal consistency, but a α value of > .60 is sometimes used in 
exploratory studies within the social sciences (Hair et al., 2010). In this study the 
values ranged from a poor α = .57 to a reasonable α = .69.  
The two-dimensional political self-placement instrument used in this study had one 
measurement for social and another for economic values. This way of measuring 
political identity is considered standard. However, we cannot know how 
correspondent symbolic and operational ideology are in this sample and must presume 
that this to be a measurement of symbolic ideology (Feldman & Johnston, 2013; 20 
Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2009). 
Methodically, it should be noted that there are many varying clustering algorithms and 
methods. Since they depend on their own assumptions and mathematical models 
clustering is to be considered an approximation of reality at best (Hair et al., 2014). 
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However, this study encompasses a representative portion of FNDU students, and this 
provides descriptive perspective of the observed values and how they group in the 
sample even if the differences between the groups are fairly small. 
Theoretically, the MFT has been criticised for ignoring other possible candidate 
foundations and basing the base of the theory on assumptions rather than empiricism 
and previously established theory (e.g. Suhler & Chrurchland, 2011). The original 
validation study yielded less than optimal results even though the moral foundations 
clearly correlate with distinct characteristics and values the theory is considered more 
a work in progress than a full description of human morality (Graham et al. 2011). 
Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility of latent classes of common values that are 
simply not measured by this instrument or reflected in a way that is hard to recognise. 
Here further studies comparing the MFT to other standardised value-measures would 
be welcome to establish a more exhaustive and explanatory model. 
As discussed earlier, the sample had a skewed gender representation. Even though it 
is representative of the gender distribution observed in the Finnish Defence Forces it 
is not representative of the general population (FDF, 2017). This begs the question 
whether this study has observed the MFT and political values of military student men 
only or military students in general regardless of gender? This discrepancy calls for 
studies with a larger sample with a more even gender representation.   
Furthermore, the military organisation is a large one with several individual facets. 
This study examined a sample representative of FNDU students, and it is quite 
possible that the results do not extend further within the organisation - to veteran 
officers or career non-commissioned officers for example. Thus, research into the 
other service branches and their different levels would prove interesting to see whether 
these results replicate.  
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7.2. Conclusions and relevance 
This is the first study to examine the MFTs functionality in a military sample by 
combining the MFQ with political a self-placement measurement. Thus, this study 
may be considered pioneering research into the MFT within the military context. The 
results provide an indication of how the MFT works in this military population and 
gives insight into what military cadette students at the FNDU consider important when 
moralising and how this is reflected into the political sphere. Furthermore, 
contemporary MFT research has encountered replication problems, especially in 
cross-cultural populations. By utilising the same methodology of combining cluster-
analysis with political self-placement instruments that previous studies have used, this 
study also contributes to the base of data needed to explore why replication of the 
original MFT findings might be so difficult. 
Loyalty and Authority where consistently the most important foundations across the 
sample while Sanctity, Harm, and Fairness scored lower. The results counter the 
popular belief that military individuals would be conservative and authoritarian 
through and through, as the results point toward a degree moral diversity among the 
sample. This diversity of values extends to the political spectrum as well, with the 
whole sample being centre-liberal on social values and centre-right on economic 
values with some amount of spread across the field. As Ingroup-Loyalty and Authority 
were the foundations with least variation and consistently high scores across the 
sample I suggest that this might be the main unifying quality among the military 
populous but would be considered an anomaly in any WEIRD population with regards 
to the variance of the political self-placement scores.  
Comparing the correlations revealed that Authority and Loyalty were positively 
associated, and Fairness was negatively associated with right-conservatism. The 
individualising foundations correlated positively amongst themselves as did the 
binding foundations, apart from Sanctity, which correlated positively with all 
foundations. This replicates previous findings, apart from the Sanctity foundation (e.g. 
Graham et al., 2011; Haidt et al., 2012; Haidt et al., 2009; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 
2015). 
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When clustering the MFQ material, a four-cluster model appeared to give the best 
explanatory value. However, it is worth to mention that the two- and three-cluster 
models were almost equally good and could be worth exploring later. The four clusters 
did not clearly associate with any previous studies results, but they had many 
characteristics reminiscent of Haidt et al. (2009) four MFT clusters. The tendency for 
the individualising foundations to decrease while the binding foundations increase, 
observed in Nilsson and Erlandsson (2015), was not as clearly observed in this sample. 
On the contrary, in this sample it seems that the relative relationship between the 
foundations in each cluster is more informative than the sum-total of each separate 
foundation when relating to political identity.  
The Loyal-Liberal cluster had the largest discrepancy between the binding- and 
individualising foundations. It had the most economically leftist and socially liberal 
means, which would be typical for a left-liberal profile. The Loyal-Conservative 
cluster had high but relatively even scores in all foundations and placed centre-
conservative on the political scales. The remaining two clusters were most interesting. 
The Authoritarian-Conservative clusters MFT profile was like an inverted Loyal-
Liberal profile and this cluster was the most right-conservative economically and 
socially. The Libertarian cluster scored low in all foundations and had the most liberal 
views socially but still held right oriented economical values.  
These findings partially support my first hypothesis of four clusters with a liberal, 
libertarian, conservative and semi-conservative clusters formed according to the MFT. 
However, the liberal and libertarian clusters displayed higher Loyalty and Authority 
scores than the expected, and the smaller conservative cluster had surprisingly high 
Authority. This reflects the main anomaly of this sample – MFT profiles with high 
Authority and Loyalty that still identify as socially liberal. This is contrary to what 
both the Haidt et al. (2009) and the Nilsson and Erlandsson (2015) models would 
predict, as these results display MFT profiles that should identify as quite conservative 
but hold liberal social values. This could probably be partially attributed to the military 
context, where these values are observably held in high regard regardless of political 
identification or other personal values. 
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My second hypothesis is also partially supported by the results, even though the 
political differences between the clusters remained small. The liberal and libertarian 
clusters were significantly more socially liberal than both conservative clusters.  
Some might consider the observed value pluralism unexpected from a niche 
population such as the FNDU, where the university’s selection process would be 
expected to align the students. However, I believe that the mandatory military service 
system along with the relatively egalitarian opportunities for university education in 
Finland might contribute to the versatility in these values. Nonetheless, the absolute 
MFT value discrepancies between the clusters were relatively small compared to 
previous studies and the differences on the economic value spectrum were 
insignificant whereas the differences in social values were significant but small. 
Conclusively, the scientific relevance of this study lies in piloting the research of the 
MFT into the military context by analysing the clusters that formed in the sample. The 
societal relevance of these results lies in questioning the stereotypical expectations 
that society might have on military cadettes as this study shows that military cadettes 
are equipped with a diverse set of values, even though they conform on the levels that 
ought to be important in the military context – Loyalty and Authority. At the same 
time, this is a weird observation in any WEIRD population. However, more research 
applied on broader military samples is warranted to confirm the results of this study, 
both nationally, by gender and cross-culturally. Nonetheless, this study gives a fair 
overview of the FNDU cadettes moral foundations. 
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